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Abstract
The neurobiological understanding of mood, and by extension mood disorders, remains elu-
sive despite decades of research implicating several neuromodulator systems. This review con-
siders a new approach based on existing theories of functional brain organisation. The free
energy principle (a.k.a. active inference), and its instantiation in the Bayesian brain, offers a
complete and simple formulation of mood. It has been proposed that emotions reflect the pre-
cision of – or certainty about – the predicted sensorimotor/interoceptive consequences of
action. By extending this reasoning, in a hierarchical setting, we suggest mood states act as
(hyper) priors over uncertainty (i.e. emotions). Here, we consider the same computational
pathology in the proprioceptive and interoceptive (behavioural and autonomic) domain in
order to furnish an explanation for mood disorders. This formulation reconciles several
strands of research at multiple levels of enquiry.
The current predicament
Mood disorders are heterogeneous and complex and depend upon the interplay of several neu-
romodulator systems and genetic and epigenetic factors (Hirschfeld, 2000; Holsboer, 2000;
Nestler & Carlezon, 2006; Nutt et al. 2007; Dowlati et al. 2010; Möhler, 2012). As a result, cur-
rent approaches to diagnosis and classification of mood disorders suffer several shortcomings
(Nesse & Stein, 2012), and advances in understanding the underlying neurobiology have been
slow. We argue that progress may be facilitated by an appreciation of the dynamic and self-
organising nature of neurobiological systems (Seth, 2013; Fotopoulou, 2015; Clark et al. 2016).
The brain is a generative organ
Traditional hypotheses propose that the neurobiological underpinnings of a variety of disor-
ders arise from structural or functional abnormalities in the brain consequent on a combin-
ation of environmental stress and genetic vulnerabilities (Videbech & Ravnkilde, 2004;
Ota & Duman, 2013; Duman, 2014). Similarly, it has been argued that pharmacotherapy
may work via its effects on neurogenesis and synaptic plasticity (Santarelli et al. 2003;
Anacker et al. 2011; Castrén & Hen, 2013) and that stressors may leave an indelible scar on
key neurobiological systems that disrupts their structure and/or function. In this sense, the
traditional hypothesis is that brain abnormalities develop throughout the lifespan and result
in the onset and maintenance of psychopathology.
However, modern accounts of brain function reject the classical notion of the brain as a
passive organ in favour of theories of embodiment and self-organisation (Friston, 2010;
Seth, 2013; Corlett & Fletcher, 2014). Specifically, recent theoretical accounts propose that
the brain works towards an equilibrium in which its environment is rendered predictable;
i.e. surprise is minimised and uncertainty resolved (Friston, 2009). Essentially, the brain
embodies a generative model that encodes prior beliefs about sensory input and their causes.
This model generates predictions which are tested against actual input to produce prediction
errors (surprise). These prediction errors are then used by the brain to revise its model of the
world. In so doing, it updates its predictions and minimises prediction error (Friston, 2010).
On this view, prior beliefs about the world, as discussed above, are represented in terms of
probability distributions. The sufficient statistics for these distributions may be labelled as
‘expectation’ and ‘precision’ and, if the brain embodies such priors, it follows that they
must be represented in its physical activity and anatomy. It is thought that expectations
(and subsequent predictions) are encoded by synaptic activity, while precision, or uncertainty,
is encoded by the extent to which this activity is attenuated or amplified (Friston & Kiebel,
2009), e.g. through careful synaptic efficacy or gain control. In current predictive coding for-
mulations of the Bayesian brain, expectation and prediction error units are thought to occupy
deep and superficial pyramidal layers of cortex, respectively (Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Bastos
et al. 2012; Shipp et al. 2013); such that predictions generated, from expectations, at one
level of the cortical hierarchy descend to form prediction errors in superficial layers of the
level below. These prediction error units then send ascending signals to update expectations.
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Crucially, the precision or confidence placed in prediction errors
is then associated with the synaptic gain or efficacy of superficial
pyramidal cells – that itself depends upon interactions with
inhibitory interneurons and modulatory neurotransmission.
This is a brief description of hierarchical predictive coding. In
what follows, we look more closely at the back story to predictive
coding; namely, free energy minimisation and allostasis.
The free energy principle
The brain, like other biological systems, seeks to maintain its
physiological (and psychological) state in the face of a constantly
changing internal and external environment and must therefore
minimise entropy over external states (where entropy is a math-
ematical measure of uncertainty or expected surprise). Directly
computing surprise is intractable, but by appealing to variational
principles, we can calculate an upper boundary on surprise,
namely free energy, which systems will (or will appear to) minim-
ise (Friston et al. 2006). Given that surprise is the inverse of model
evidence, if the brain is minimising a free energy bound on sur-
prise, it is necessarily trying to maximise the sensory evidence
for its model of the world and is inherently self-evidencing
(Hohwy, 2016). Under some simplifying assumptions, one can
equate surprise with (precision weighted) prediction error. In
brief, the brain can minimise (precision weighted) prediction
error in three ways. First, expectations can be updated (by chan-
ging neuronal activity) so that predictions provide a better explan-
ation for sensory inputs (Friston et al. 2006). Alternatively, the
brain can change the world or the way it is sampled (by engaging
motor and autonomic reflexes) so that sensations fall into line
with predictions. This provides a simple explanation for behav-
iour, which becomes the fulfilment of predicted (proprioceptive
and somatosensory) motor sensations. Finally, both of these pro-
cesses (perception and action) can be nuanced by optimising the
precision of prediction errors. In cognitive neuroscience, this opti-
misation has been framed in terms of attention and attenuation.
In other words, attending to a sensory stream corresponds to
increasing its sensory precision through appropriate synaptic
gain control. Conversely, sensory attenuation corresponds to the
reduction of precision by attending away from or ignoring the
consequences of one’s own action.
The active minimisation of free energy is known as active infer-
ence, which means the brain can selectively sample from data that
concur with its current expectations (Friston et al. 2011; Pezzulo,
2012). In the interoceptive domain, the resolution of prediction
errors through autonomic reflexes provides a simple account of
homoeostasis. This formulation can be extended by appealing
to hierarchical generative models such that predictions at higher
levels pre-empt the need for homoeostasis [e.g. in a hypogly-
caemic state, by attenuating the precision of prediction errors
reporting hypoglycaemia, we can suspend the reflex mobilisation
of glucose and act on the world (by eating) to fulfil and maintain
higher level predictions] (Pezzulo et al. 2015). This hierarchical
minimisation of prediction errors allows allostatic control over
homoeostatic reflexes (Sterling & Eyer, 1988; McEwen, 1998;
Ramsay & Woods, 2014). Note that the balance between allostasis
and homoeostasis depends on attenuating interoceptive prediction
errors, which will be an important theme in what follows. In this
way, a self-regulating embodied loop of circular causality is con-
structed in which the brain constructs the external environment
(and internal milieu) it expects to encounter, which in turn rein-
forces its predictions (Seth, 2014; Barrett & Simmons, 2015).
Free energy and emotion
Recent theoretical arguments have converged on the idea that
emotional states reflect changes in the uncertainty about the som-
atic consequences of action (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Wager et al.
2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). This uncertainty refers to the preci-
sion with which motor and physiological states can be predicted.
In this setting, negative emotions contextualise events that induce
expectations of unpredictability, while positive emotions refer to
events that resolve uncertainty and confer a feeling of control
(Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Gu et al. 2013). This ties emotional
states to the resolution of uncertainty and, through the biophys-
ical encoding of precision, to neuromodulation and cortical gain
control (Brown & Friston, 2012).
In summary, one can associate the valence of emotional stim-
uli with the precision of prior beliefs about the consequences of
action. In this view, positively valenced brain states are necessarily
associated with increases in the precision of predictions about the
(controllable) future – or, more simply, predictable consequences
of motor or autonomic behaviour. Conversely, negative emotions
correspond to a loss of prior precision and a sense of helplessness
and uncertainty about the consequences of action.
What about mood?
Any hierarchical inference relies on hyperpriors. These furnish
higher level predictions of the likely value of lower level para-
meters. From the above, one can see that important parameters
are the precisions of prediction errors at high and low levels of
the hierarchy (i.e. prior and sensory precision). These precisions
reflect the confidence we place in our prior beliefs relative to sen-
sory evidence. If emotional states in the brain reflect the precision
of prior beliefs about the consequences of action, then distinct
neuronal populations must also encode hyperpriors. In other
words, short-term fluctuations in precision (i.e. emotional fluc-
tuations) will themselves be constrained by hyperpriors encoding
their long-term average (i.e. mood).
Here, we propose that mood corresponds to hyperpriors about
emotional states, or confidence about the consequences of action.
In other words, mood states reflect the prior expectation about
precision that nuances (emotional) fluctuations in confidence or
uncertainty. If emotion reflects interoceptive precision, and is bio-
physically encoded by neuromodulatory gain control, then this
suggests that mood is neurobiologically encoded as the set-point
of neuromodulator systems that determine synaptic gain control
over principal cells reporting prediction errors at different levels
of the interoceptive hierarchy. This set-point is the sensitivity of
responses to prediction errors and has a profound and enduring
effect on subsequent inference.
When mood goes wrong
An interesting corollary of the above account is that mood
becomes a two-dimensional construct – according to the suffi-
cient statistics (i.e. mean or expectation and precision) of hyper-
priors over interoceptive precision (Fig. 1). In this sense, we
might conjecture that major depression occurs when the brain
is certain that it will encounter an uncertain environment, i.e.
the world is inherently volatile, capricious, unpredictable and
uncontrollable. There are several concomitants of this state of
affairs: if, a priori, prior beliefs are deemed imprecise, then the
attenuation of interoceptive prediction errors will be
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compromised. This means that allostatic control is precluded –
and is replaced by low-level homoeostatic responses (Barrett
et al. 2016; Stephan et al. 2016; Peters et al. 2017). A corollary
of this is that patients with low mood (low prior precision)
should show a hypersensitivity to interoceptive cues (high sensory
precision) and a failure of sensory attenuation (Badcock et al.
2017) – of the sort associated with stress responses (please see
below).
Clearly, hyperpriors may be genetically encoded, although they
may also change following chronic periods of intense stress (see
below). This means the set-point of neuromodulator systems
becomes configured to an aberrant tonic drive that is resistant
to negative feedback loops that relay error messages (i.e. a loss
of high-level precision that is reflected in persistently abnormal
neuromodulation at the synaptic level). This may relate particu-
larly to anhedonia (Chekroud, 2015). In this formalism, pleasure
signals (bottom-up signals which increase interoceptive precision
and confer a sense of control) – such as those generated by
hedonic hotspots in hierarchically deep limbic circuitry
(Berridge & Kringelbach) are attenuated – so feelings of pleasure
are never initiated (Fig. 2). Such exquisite gain control – that nor-
mally allows for a precise repertoire of (stress reducing) behaviour
– is denied to the depressed individual, who will fail to engage in
(allostatic) actions that are likely to mitigate negative emotions. As
precision enforces prediction-fulfilling action, maladaptive
behaviours may therefore be conceptualised as an aberrant action-
perception cycle that is self-reinforcing – or self-evidencing
(Hohwy, 2016).
Mania may be associated with a comparable level of precision
over expected emotional states but here, expectations are shifted
towards positive emotions (of a secure, predictable, controllable
and epistemically rich world). This means that the set-point of
neuromodulator systems will be quantitatively distinct from
depression; although they may become equally resistant to feed-
back. Accordingly, manic individuals lose the capacity to appreci-
ate the unpredictable consequences of their actions and will
engage in overconfident, high-risk behaviours (Mason et al.
2017). This has interesting parallels with theories of optimal con-
trol and reinforcement learning in which a link between action
(e.g. pushing a button) and outcome (e.g. losing money) reinforce
avoidance behaviour – a phenomenon which is absent or
impaired in mania (see below) (Bach & Dolan, 2012).
The existence of mixed states can also be accounted for under
this model. Note that mania and depression share an inappropri-
ately precise prior over emotional states. As such, predictions
encoded by such a precise prior – which do not lie at the extrema
of mean values – could potentially manifest as mixed states, show-
ing some manic and some depressive features. In Fig. 1 such states
would lie in the intermediary region between the top and bottom
right-hand corner.
Similarly, anxious depression can be described by a highly
uncertain belief (hyperprior) about negative emotions (a loss of
prior precision). This means the tonic drives of neuromodulator
systems should be comparable to that in depression, but remain
more responsive to peripheral feedback. One interesting conse-
quence of this state, however, is a lack of action, given action is
only possible when prior expectations are precise. In short, by
framing mood as the hyperprior over emotional states, we can
describe a wide range of abnormal mood states according to
their different co-ordinates along a two-dimensional continuum.
The existing evidence
Neuromodulatory systems
If the account on offer is correct, we would expect an aberrant set-
point for various neuromodulator systems that are specifically
associated with abnormal mood states. More formally, these sys-
tems will be configured to a set-point whereby levels of stress
modulators are elevated and anti-stress modulators are lowered,
and receptor sensitivity is altered to ensure these levels are resist-
ant to negative feedback from bottom-up (interoceptive) feedback
from the body.
In healthy systems, mood should be affected by the valence of
tightly controlled prediction errors. Recent animal work has
shown that positive prediction errors (receiving more food than
expected), show a strong positive correlation with dopaminergic
change in the nucleus accumbens (Hart et al. 2014) with corre-
sponding changes in functional brain activity in humans during
a financial reward task (Rutledge et al. 2010). Similarly, it has
been shown that signal change in the anterior insula is signifi-
cantly related to the magnitude of prediction error (Bossaerts,
2010). The pharmacological manipulation of these networks
was recently demonstrated where participants were given electric
shocks (harms) in exchange for financial reward (gains), and
offered the option of increasing the number of shocks in exchange
for greater reward. It was shown that citalopram increased
Fig. 1. The figure shows how mood can be conceptualised according to the expected
precision (μ) and precision of precision (τ) in a two-dimensional space. Here, preci-
sion per se corresponds to the predictability of the (prosocial, affiliative and intero-
ceptive) world – and the two dimensions correspond to hyperpriors over precision. It
is proposed that pathological changes in mood occur in the extrema of this space, as
highlighted. Depression occurs when an uncertain, unpredictable outcome is pre-
dicted with high precision (red lines) resulting in a chronic, self-maintaining negative
emotional state that is resistant to revision. Mania (blue lines) is characterised by an
equally high precision, but with the expectation of a predictable and controllable
outcome – correspondingly the environment is chronically and inappropriately
labelled as such. Anxiety (green lines) is an expected unpredictability but with low
precision. As such, the individual engages in behaviour designed to resolve this
uncertainty but which never does. D, depression; M, Mania; Ax, anxious depression.
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harm-aversion, while levodopa made individuals more likely to
harm themselves than others (Crockett et al. 2015). This fits
nicely with our notion that serotonin levels (and other neuromo-
dulators) encode expectations about likely negative outcomes and
encourage the fulfilment of these predictions through action (i.e.
low levels promote behaviour with negative outcomes).
A much richer literature of neuropharmacology in mood dis-
orders exists, and fits nicely with our theories. What is crucial is
that the same systems are implicated across depression, mania and
anxiety though the basal levels (expectations) and feedback sensi-
tivity (precision) of these systems differs accordingly. Take, e.g.
the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis. In depression
there is increased paraventricular nucleus (PVN) drive and
CRH production (Raadsheer et al. 1994; Gao et al. 2013) and
resistance to glucocorticoid receptor (GR) mediated negative feed-
back (Holsboer et al. 1982; Sher et al. 2013). We would expect that
anxiety states are associated with similar basal drive but increased
resistance to feedback. Indeed it has been shown that patients
with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have heightened
HPA axis drive originating at the amygdala (Shin et al. 2006)
and PVN (Kasckow et al. 2001) and decreased inhibitory input
from the hippocampus (Smith, 2005), although they show
increased sensitivity to dexamethasone suppression test (Yehuda
et al. 1993). This explains the finding of lower cortisol levels in
certain testing conditions only (Meewisse et al. 2007). Mania is
less well studied but there are reports of underactive HPA axis
drive being particularly related to euphoria (Valiengo et al. 2012).
The effects of environmental trauma
If the brain is an organ of inference, that attempts to reduce the
surprise associated with environmental outcomes, then its synap-
tic activity and tonic drives should be in line with its (prior and
hyperprior) expectations. Active inference attempts to construct
an environment (and physiology) consistent with these expecta-
tions. However, chronic unpredictability warrants a change in
reliability or precision afforded to social and physiological cues.
In this regard, active inference may explain the established finding
that childhood trauma poses a risk for various psychopathologies
(Bernet & Stein, 1999; Heim & Nemeroff, 2001; Heim et al. 2008).
In this context, it is important to acknowledge how different types
of traumatic experiences may impact differentially on predictions
in the brain. Stress of any kind induces uncertainty, though the
nature of this stress may determine whether the mood state will
be a depressed one or an anxious one. More chronic and less well-
defined adversity – which is experienced during emotional or
physical neglect – is pervasive and enduring and should result
in great certainty over uncertain (interoceptive) outcomes of
(affiliative or prosocial) action. As such, depression would be
associated with this type of trauma. In line with this, a recent
study in bipolar depression demonstrated that, despite all
domains of the childhood trauma being significantly more
prevalent in patients than controls, only emotional neglect
predicted psychopathology (Watson et al. 2014). Conversely,
more acute and explicit traumatic experiences would change
Fig. 2. The figure shows a schematic of the neuromodulatory systems with the probability distributions the embody also displayed. Ascending projections (pre-
diction errors) are shown in red and cortical projections (predictions of precision) are in blue. The expected precision (at different levels of the cortical hierarchy) is
encoded by a tonic drive – that exerts a gain control over the red (ascending) projections. Each ascending projection conveys some newsworthy (unpredicted)
information. The cortical hierarchy assembles this information (i.e. prediction errors) into an updated representation of the body and world – including its pre-
dictability. Our focus in this paper is predictions of predictability (i.e. precision) that are informed by the amplitude of prediction errors from different parts of
the cortical hierarchy. (a) Shows the balance in a healthy system. Mood is liable to change with environmental fluctuations due to a precision that mediates fluc-
tuations in synaptic gain. (b) Shows how this fails in depression. A chronically stressful environment has mandated a tonically depleted serotonin drive and the
estimated precision is chronically low. This precludes precise prior beliefs (and adaptive stress reducing influences from, e.g prefrontal cortex), thereby exposing
cortical updating to ascending (unattenuated) autonomic drives. It is important to note this schematic is highly simplified and that similar changes may play out in
other neuromodulatory systems across other mood disorders.
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expectations but render them highly uncertain (i.e. induce an
anxiety state). This is perhaps best exemplified by the risk
posed for PTSD by acute and extreme episodes of trauma
(Sullivan et al. 2006).
One important corollary of the theory presented above is that
risk of mood disorders is intimately tied to emotional trauma
only. This accords with the findings from recent studies
(Watson et al. 2014) though not others. Instead, it is proposed
that (barring brain damage) physically traumatic events facilitate
the onset of mood disorders through the subjective feelings that
contextualise them. One other interesting consequence of the
active inference formulation is that, as mood refers to hyperpriors
over interoceptive states, it is non-specific to different types of
environmental fluctuations; i.e. their particular content. This
means predictable environmental outcomes elsewhere can act as
a buffer against the detrimental effects of trauma (Southwick &
Charney, 2012). This has clear and important ramifications for
preventive strategies – and may also explain why traumatic experi-
ences are not invariably associated with the onset of psychopath-
ology despite biologic effects (Carpenter et al. 2007).
The emergence of epigenetics
If environmental factors can induce conformational changes in
the set-point of neurobiological systems to precipitate onset of
mood disorders, then some explanatory mechanism is required.
Epigenetics has emerged as a major field of enquiry in recent
years, specifically in relation to methylation of the NR3C1 gene,
which encodes GR (Nantharat et al. 2015; Smart et al. 2015;
Palma-Gudiel et al. 2016). Crucially, GRs are found in the hippo-
campus and amygdala (Morimoto et al. 1996); regions that send
descending predictions to the paraventricular nucleus (Herman
et al. 2002). A loss of sensitivity to circulating cortisol levels in
the amygdala and hippocampus may be the neurophysiological
correlates of aberrant hyperpriors that set the neuromodulatory
tone for amplification and attenuation of the PVN. Although
speculative, this provides a potential framework that can be mod-
elled in terms of active inference and is entirely consistent with
theories based upon allostasis (McEwen, 2000; Radley et al.
2011; Braithwaite et al. 2015).
Our ideas also explain why epigenetic variability tends to occur
at critical periods of development (Heim & Binder, 2012). In this
regard it is important to remember that error signals can only be
attenuated in states of high prior precision (confidence in the con-
sequences of behaviour). Crucially, this certainty can only be
inherited from a stable environment experienced over time, and
so epigenetic alteration in neuromodulatory systems is more likely
to occur when systems experience new or unpredictable environ-
ments and thus expect a higher degree of uncertainty. The most
obvious time when this would occur is the immediate neonatal
and infancy period when biological systems have almost no
prior experience. The set-point of these systems, at this time,
encodes an imprecise (i.e. flat or uninformative) prior that is wait-
ing to be informed through experience. This conforms to an ele-
gant study by Weaver et al. (2004) who showed a rapid increase in
DNA methylation in rodents the day after birth. However, they
also showed that methylation rates rapidly declined in rodents
who were maternally groomed and nurtured while rates remained
elevated in neglected pups (Weaver et al. 2004). This implicates a
role of maternal care in establishing an appropriate physiological
set-point and ensuring it is precise enough to resist some form of
future stress challenge. It also shows that adversity experienced in
early life is critically important in establishing vulnerability
towards onset of mood disorders.
Psychological theories
Psychological theories of mood are important and remain a chal-
lenge for most biological accounts. Perhaps the best model to date
is learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). We have characterised
depression by inappropriately high precision in the negative con-
sequences of action for the individual’s internal states.
Accordingly this results in failure by the individual to engage
with potentially positive outcomes of action. However, as dis-
cussed above, high precision also facilitates allostasis in order to
preserve current states and so not only would depression result
in failure to attend to positive stimuli but it would result in active
inference to preserve the depressed state resulting in the behav-
iour that we associate with learned helplessness.
A more recent and promising psychological model of depres-
sion stems from the demonstration of attentional bias in patients
towards negative facial expressions (Duque & Vázquez, 2015).
Harmer et al. have thus proposed that a negative emotional bias
is a core feature of depression and is the psychological target of
antidepressant medication (Harmer et al. 2009; Harmer &
Cowen, 2013) and correspondingly that modulating attentional
bias can provide therapeutic benefit (Browning et al. 2012).
Active inference requires precise coding so interoceptive informa-
tion that is inconsistent with the current state can be attenuated,
as such, in depression, we would expect sensory attenuation away
from positive stimuli and greater attention towards negative stim-
uli – in line with psychological expectations that are biologically
encoded.
Much experimental work has also shown an increased
response to rewarding stimuli in bipolar disorder, which can be
accounted for by our theory in which manic patients expect a
pleasurable outcome (i.e. a reward) from their actions – even if
this is highly unlikely. This has been demonstrated using self-
report measures of behavioural drive (Van der Gucht et al.
2009) and response time analyses to financial reward cues
(Singh et al. 2013). Accordingly patients also show a failure to
learn from punishing cues (Mueller et al. 2010). Conversely,
depressed patients show a reward hyposensitivity in line with
overly precise prior prediction of a negative outcome and subse-
quent aversion to positive bottom-up (interoceptive) signals
(Eshel & Roiser, 2010).
Future work
If the functional anatomy of mood involves alterations in tonic
neuromodulatory drives, then it will affect communication
between higher and lower levels of the extended interoceptive sys-
tem. As such, any functional brain investigations in mood disor-
ders must be capable of quantifying effective connectivity between
relevant networks and evaluating how this connectivity is modu-
lated by external factors. Dynamic causal modelling is well placed
in this regard (Friston et al. 2003) and could prove a fruitful tool
for further investigation – specifically in examining the task-
dependent coupling between hierarchical levels of neuromodula-
tor control (Schlosser et al. 2008; Lu et al. 2012; Radaelli et al.
2015; Vai et al. 2015; Vai et al. 2016).
Given the discussions above, we would expect not only differ-
ences in effective connectivity along neuromodulatory axes, but
also differences in the way this connectivity is modulated
Psychological Medicine 5
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according to external stimuli. Very few studies have been con-
ducted along these lines but it is interesting to note a handful
that have. Sladky et al. showed that patients with social anxiety
disorder demonstrated increased activation in orbitofrontal cortex
and amygdala when viewing emotional faces (Sladky et al. 2012),
but furthermore, in controls this network shows top-down modu-
lation – which is reversed in patients – orbitofrontal cortex drives
greater activation in amygdala (Sladky et al. 2015). This fits nicely
with our theories; where pathological anxiety is associated with an
expectation of emotional negative environment (increased tonic
activity in the limbic–prefrontal network) but also with a com-
plete loss of precision and failure to dampen ascending informa-
tion (loss of top-down inhibitory control). Prefrontal–amygdala
connectivity in depressed patients has also been investigated in
two studies, showing reduced top-down dorsolateral prefrontal
modulation of amygdala response to negative images in bipolar
depression (Radaelli et al. 2015) with a converse pattern of
increased orbitomedial–amygdala connectivity when viewing
positive faces (de Almeida et al. 2009). This is very much in
line with our arguments presented above, but the imperative
remains for further studies that can fully quantify neurobiologi-
cally coded expectations and precisions across different axes.
The perspective afforded by mood as a hyperprior suggests a
separation of timescales in terms of responding to prediction
errors. An adaptive response to a volatile environment in which
the amplitude of prediction errors is, itself, on average high
would suggest a mood-lowering reduction in the estimated preci-
sion of prediction errors. This is something that could, in prin-
ciple, be tested experimentally using a mood induction
paradigm predicated on experimentally induced prediction errors.
One interesting way of achieving this may be measuring gaze dur-
ation in mood congruent and incongruent ambiguity resolving
contexts, during word reading tasks.
Our theoretical account of mood may also be useful in inform-
ing molecular studies by hypothesising how alterations in intero-
ceptive computation might play out biologically, and how this can
be manipulated therapeutically. Take the example of depression.
As discussed this state corresponds to the very precise expectation
of a negatively valenced environment, which allows resistance to
contradictory (positive) information and ensures behaviour in
line with the depressed state. We are therefore presented with
two possible avenues for treatment:
(1) Alter the expectation of an uncertain and uncontrollable body
(or world)
(2) Alter the body (or world) to enable a revision of expected
uncertainty.
These broadly concord with current treatment approaches of
which the first the most widely used via pharmacological manip-
ulations of neuromodulation. If depression – and other mood dis-
orders – are the result of a computational pathology then no
single neuromodulator system will be implicated in every patient;
possibly reflecting the vast number of treatment-resistant patients
and the failure to find a consistent biomarker. Higher level pro-
cessing, as considered here, is the result of an array of ascending
inputs and so the same computational pathology may be manifest
by any pathophysiology that involves neuromodulatory systems.
This speaks to figuring out ways to tailor pharmacological inter-
ventions to better match the needs of individual patients. One
recent and novel study has employed machine-learning techni-
ques to predict treatment outcome in clinical trials (Chekroud,
2015) and represents a potentially important approach; however,
it may be possible to go one step further and replace the search for
a biomarker with a computational signature (Nitsche et al. 2010;
Huys et al. 2011; Barch et al. 2012; Montague et al. 2012; Wang &
Krystal, 2014).
Conclusions
Much evidence over recent decades has converged on the idea
that the brain is in the game of predicting its sensorium and
working to minimise the difference between these predictions
and actual sensory input. Further evidence suggests emotional
states reflect the precision associated with neurobiological predic-
tions over interoceptive states. In this paper, we have extended
this formalism to a further level of the hierarchy and suggested
mood acts as a hyperprior over emotional states. This notion
has gained traction as an explanation for autism and schizophre-
nia in the exteroceptive (perceptual) domain (Lawson et al. 2014;
Corlett, 2017; Krystal et al. 2017). We have explored the evidence
for this theory and suggested how it might inform further research.
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